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Introduction*
This paper analyzes capital tax competition in a model with endogenous policy formation and interest groups. In an open economy with internationally mobile capital, investors have the possibility to transfer their capital to the country offering the most favorable investment conditions. This opportunity leads to an additional constraint for national tax policy:
l capital that is taxed heavily in the country where it is invested may escape to other countries with a lower tax burden. Governments then have to compete for this internationally mobile capital as a tax base.
In the last years ah extensive theoretical literature has developed that investigates many aspects of interjurisdictional tax competition caused by capital mobility. This literature usually deals with capital taxes raised entirely for allocative reasons, namely to finance public goods or services that the private sector cannot adequately provide. 2 As one of the main results, it implies that tax competition between sufficiently similar countries leads to declining source-based capital taxes and therefore either lower levels of public spending or higher taxes on immobile * A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the 6th Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy, 1995. I thank participants of this workshop for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper draws on some results of my doctoral thesis, entitled "Standortwettbewerb bei internationaler Kapitalmobilitat -Eine modelltheoretische Untersuchung". Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Capital taxation is only one domain where international capital mobility may lead to competition between governments or other national institutions. For a general description of institutional competition caused by international capital mobility, sec e.g. Siebert, Koop (1990) .
2 Examples are the works of Zodrow, Mieszkowski (1986) , Wilson (1986) , Bucovetsky, Wilson (1991) , Wildasin (1989) , Oates, Schwab (1988 and Razin, Sadka (1991a , 1991b ).
-2-factors compared to a closed economy. 3 Since governments are predominantly assumed to maximize the welfare of their respective representative citizen, capital tax competition with a source-based capital tax is usually viewed as inefficient. A coordination of national tax policies would then increase welfare of all households in all countries. 4 In contrast to the literature on tax competition with allocative capital taxes, this paper focuses on redistributive capital taxation. The better a household is endowed with capital, the more a declining net interest rate caused by rising capital taxes affects his factor income. 5 Different capital endowments of the households therefore lead to a redistributional conflict concerning the desired capital tax, that can-3 Bucovetsky, Wilson (1991) and Razin, Sadka (1991a) show that this result holds as long as residence-based capital taxes cannot be raised adequately in addition to sourcebased capital taxes. 4 In contrast to the assumption of purely welfare maximizing governments, Edwards, Keen (1994) and Rauscher (1996) investigate tax competition in a "Leviathan" model of the government (see also S. Sinn, 1992) . They reach ambiguous conclusions concerning the welfare effects of tax competition with international capital mobility.
5 Ghosh (1991) , Persson, Tabellini (1992) and Schulze (1996) also treat tax competition with redistributive capital taxes. Ghosh (1991) combines a model of tax competition with allocative capital taxes with an overlapping generations approach where redistributional conflicts arise between young households, who earn labor income and save for their retirement, and old households, who live entirely from the capital income of past savings. Assuming an exogenously given political objective function, he shows that capital mobility no longer leads to unambiguously decreasing capital taxes. Schulze (1996) considers a tax on capital exports in a model where the tax proceeds are distributed between households according to their share of total factor income. With these assumptions, he shows that the most preferred tax rate of a certain household depends on his capital-labor endowment ratio. The model and the results of Persson, Tabellini (1992) are treated in section 2 below.
-3-not be treated in representative household models. 6 Households with a low capital endowment prefer a relatively high capital tax rate compared to households relatively well endowed with capital preferring a lower capital tax rate or even a capital subsidy. The capital tax rate that is actually imposed then depends on the degree to which the respective interests of the different households are represented in the process of political decision making.
As section 2 of this paper shows, tax competition with source-based capital taxes leads to declining redistribution between households differing with respect to their capital endowment. As tax competition intensifies, a positive capital tax rate, redistributing from capital rich to capital poor households, declines and a negative capital tax rate, redistributing in the other direction, rises. With a redistributional impact of capital taxes, tax competition can no longer be viewed as unambiguously welfare decreasing for all households. Those households who suffer from the redistnbutive activities of the government may benefit from the declining degree of redistribution.
The redistributional impact of capital taxes may give households an incentive to influence policy not only through their vote decision but also through lobbying pressure by interest groups. To shed some light on the mutual relations between lobbying and tax competition, this paper explicitly considers lobbying by interest groups in a model of representative democracy. Two main results follow from this investigation: First, as section 2 shows, lobbying by certain interest groups may have an influence on the relative position of a country in the international tax competition game. A relatively high political representation of interest groups that pursue the interests of capital poor households leads to a relatively high capital tax 6 In addition to the case of unequal capital endowments, redistributional conflicts connected with capital taxation in an open economy may also arise from an unequal distribution of immobile factors or from a capital tax that is used to finance redistributional expenditure programs.
rate in this respective country and therefore causes capital outflows to other countries.
Second, international capital mobility has consequences for lobbying activities by interest groups. As redistributional conflicts between households with different capital endowments diminish with the introduction of international capital mobility, also the incentives decline for interest groups to influence tax policy through lobbying. Section 3 shows that for certain symmetry conditions the lobbying expenditures of all interest groups decrease as international tax competition intensifies.
Thus, international capital mobility has welfare implications that,have not been treated at all in the existing literature on tax competition: International tax competition may lead to a declining amount of resources invested in lobbying and may therefore increase welfare of all households.
Redistributive Capital Taxation in an Open Economy
This section provides a basis for analyzing tax competition with redistributive capital taxation using a simple neoclassical representation of an international capital market equilibrium. It shows how source-based capital taxes influence the allocation of internationally mobile capital and how they affect the remuneration of capital and that of immobile factors. As was mentioned in the introduction, the redistributive effects of capital taxes follow from an unequal distribution of capital between households. The last part of this section shows that the redistributive impact of a capital tax continuously declines with the introduction of capital mobility and with a rising number of countries.
According to the model, the world consists of N countries. A representative firm has the possibility to produce in each of these countries the same internationally tradable composite commodity. The firm takes the prices of the good and that of production factors as given. Production factors are internationally perfectly mobile capital and internationally immobile labor. 7 The firm produces with constant returns to scale. It chooses its capital input fC and its labor input V to maximize its expected profit that is defined as follows:
In this equation, the price of the composite commodity is normalized to 1. The 
9 As long as the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption is sufficiently high as s^ approaches zero and the marginal product of capital is sufficiently high as K 1 approaches zero, an interior solution for the capital market equilibrium exists. It also meets the conditions for local dynamic stability (see appendix a). The term \\f stands for the marginal impact of an increasing capital tax rate on the domestic interest rate before an international relocation of capital takes place. This term is negative implying a negative relationship between the capital tax rate and the net return to capital in a closed economy. Since an increasing capital tax decreases aggregate savings in a closed economy, the term \|r is larger than minus
In an open economy, the impact of the domestic tax rate on the net return 10 The adjuncts 1 and -1 denote the domestic country arid a representative foreign country respectively.
11 Aggregate savings decrease with a rising capital tax rate, because the capital tax raises the relative price of future consumption and thereby causes a substitution from future consumption to present consumption. In addition to this substitution effect, an increasing capital tax also causes an income effect on individual savings depending on whether to capital causes an international relocation of capital. The invested capital stock in country 1 therefore decreases to a larger extent in an open economy (N> 1) than in a closed economy (N = 1). This follows from equation (7), that implies that the absolute value of the domestic capital reaction on a changing domestic tax rate increases with the number of competing countries.
The degree to which the capital stock reacts on a changing tax rate determines the incidence of the capital tax for the income of both factors capital and labor. With international capital mobility, a changing capital tax rate affects the income of the mobile factor capital to a lower degree than in a closed economy; the converse is true for the immobile factor. With a rising number of competing countries, the burden of the capital tax shifts more and more from the mobile factor capital to the immobile factor labor. In the limit case, where the number of countries approaches infinity, the interest rate is not affected at all by a unilateral change of the domestic capital tax rate whereas domestic labor bears all the consequences for net factor incomes. 12 These results can be derived from equations (3) and (4). Total differentiation of these equations leads to the following expressions:
the household benefits from or is burdened by the redistributional effect of capital taxes at the margin. The different income effects on individual savings, however, cancel out in the aggregate for an individual utility function that exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, so that only the substitution effect remains in the aggregate. With equations (7), (11) and (12), equation (13) can be expressed as follows:
13 A higher value of the exogenous income V leads to higher savings, if future consumption is a normal good with respect to an increasing lifetime income. The assumption of a utility function separable between present and future consumption ensures this condition to be satisfied.
14 The increasing capital tax rate also affects present and future consumption through its impact on individual savings. However, this effect is not relevant for the utility of household,/ as equation (5) implies.
-10- The first term in equation (14) then measures the redistributional effect of a capital tax. This term is positive for all household groups whose members save less than the average. These households prefer a positive tax, whereas the opposite is true for relatively capital abundant households. With a rising number of countries the redistributional impact of a capital tax declines.
Tax Competition when Lobbying Influence is Given
This section derives the equilibrium rate of a redistributive capital tax for a closed
and for an open economy. It thus shows how international capital mobility and tax competition affect redistributive capital taxation. As the proceeding section has shown, the redisributive effects of a capital tax lead to conflicting interests between households differing according to their capital endowment. Interest groups of these households therefore may exert political pressure through lobbying to influence capital taxation in their favoured direction. In the last part of this section the effects are derived of an increasing political influence of certain interest groups on capital tax rates. These effects determine the impact of lobbying on redistributive capital
taxation in an open economy.
To represent the process of political decision-making, this paper employs a probabilistic voting approach with interest groups developed by Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990a , 1990b . It describes a political contest between two parties trying to maximize the expected number of votes in a forthcoming election. Both parties announce simultaneously their respective policy platform. Afterwards, all house-holds vote in a majority-rule election for one of the parties. The winning party then enforces its policy platform.' In addition to Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990a , 1990b , this paper assumes that the parties do not expect systematic preferences in favor of one of the parties, and that both parties possess the same degree of uncertainty conclOOerning the voters'
preferences. Both parties then announce exacdy the same capital tax rate in equilibrium and the outcome of the election is not relevant for the tax rate actually 15 Thus, the model abstracts from time inconsistency and enforcement problems where the policy platform announced by a party before an election differs from the policy actually carried out by the winner of the election.
raised. 16 Elections occur simultaneously in all countries. 17 Then the equilibrium capital tax rate t in country I is chosen to maximize the following objective function, with n; as the size of interest group j, S; as utility maximizing savings of household j, and /"" as the vector of equilibrium capital tax rates abroad.
with
The following first order condition characterizes an interior symmetric equilibrium where all countries raise the same capital tax rate:
It is assumed that the objective function (15) is strictly concave in t wherever condition (16) is satisfied so that condition (16) suffices for an interior symmetric 16 Note, that the capital tax rate is the only variable considered here as an instrument of the parties in the political contest.
17 Coughlin, Mueller, Murell (1990a , 1990b have formulated their political model only for a closed country.
Bibiiofhefe im Instiruts fur Wdhvirfscl equilibrium. The equilibrium is also assumed to be stable. 18 Rearranging equation (16) iU-*£.
The expression x t measures the effects on x of a marginal increase of the capital tax rate that is carried out in all countries symmetrically: 
Proposition 1: Assume that (i) the capital tax rate maximizes equation (15) for all countries, that (ii) utility is separable with respect to present and future consumption and exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, and that (Hi) the tax competition equilibrium is stable and symmetric. Then the absolute value of the capital tax rate decreases with a rising number of countries.
Persson, Tabellini (1992) derive a similar result concerning redistributive capital taxes and capital mobility: They investigate capital taxation in a 2-period, 2-country model where capital investments abroad cause strictly convex mobility costs. In their model, tax-competition intensifies as marginal mobility costs decline. In a symmetric equilibrium, this leads to a decreasing absolute value of capital tax rates -comparable to the results derived above. However, Persson, Tabellini (1992) employ a simpler economic framework where capital is used as the only input in a linear storage technology. Furthermore, the political part of their model differs substantially from the one formulated here, since redistributional activity is not explained by the pressure of certain interest groups in the political contest. Instead, in their model the elected policymaker chooses the capital tax to maximize his own income that consistis of capital income and public transfers -comparable to the income of any other household. Equation (16) not only shows how capital mobility and tax competition affect the degree of redistributive capital taxation, it also determines the influence of lobbying on capital taxes in equilibrium. In this paper it is assumed that lobbying of interest groups affects equilibrium tax policy through its effects on the welfare weights in the political objective function (15). Through lobbying, each interest group can increase the weight of its members in the political objective function. 19 An increasing, weight of a single interest group in one country has the following effects on capital taxes in equilibrium.
The stability condition a ± [iV -\\b< 0 and the condition a < 0 together imply rate rises and this causes also a rising capital tax rate abroad. Since the change of the domestic capital tax rate exceeds that of the capital tax rate abroad, the political influence of the capital poor interest group leads to capital outflows.
Proposition 2: Given the assumptions of Proposition 1, an increasing weight of an interest group in the political objective function leads to an increasing domestic capital tax rate, if and only if the aggregate difference is negative between percapita savings of the interest group's representative member and of the representative members of all other interest groups -weighted with marginal utility and
the political weights of the respective interest groups.
-18- For the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that the utility of the households is linear with respect to future consumption. Then a changing capital tax rate or changing lobbying costs will not affect the marginal utility of future consumption, Uj , of all representative households. The first order conditions can be repre-
dB) sented as follows with
-as the marginal benefit of decreasing the domestic parties' uncertainty:
The second order condition and the condition for stability of the lobbying equilibrium are assumed to be satisfied. Capital mobility and the intensity of tax competition affect lobbying through their impact on the marginal benefit of lobbying. The 
As equation (26) shows, the interest groups not only obey the impact of their activities on domestic capital taxes in an open economy but also on capital taxes abroad. The relations between an increasing political weight and the capital tax rate at home and abroad are given by equations (21) and (22) of the proceeding section.
The following equations (27) and (28) show how an increasing capital tax rate at home and abroad affects the welfare of the representative household of interest
In the following, the paper only considers those cases where the respective capital endowment of the representative household is distributed symmetrically between the interest groups. Symmetrical distribution of the capital endowment means that for each interest group whose representative member owns a capital endowment above the average, there exists another interest group of the same size with a representative member owning a capital endowment below the average. The distance between its representative member's endowment and average endowment is the same for both interest groups. In addition, the linear utility of future consumption implies that savings are distributed exactly in the same way across the households as exogenous capital endowment, 21 and that the marginal utility of future consumption takes the same value for all households. The following analysis will show that the equilibrium lobbying outlays of interest groups can be ordered in pairs in the same way as the distance between capital endowment and average capital endowment. Governments then have no incentive to raise a redistributive capital tax or subsidy and as equation (17) implies, the capital tax rate declines to zero irrespective of the number of countries. However, for every interest group, there remains an incentive to influence policy through lobbying, so that its lobbying outlays are strictly positive. Lobbying becomes a prisoners' dilemma situation for the interest groups: Each interest group devotes resources to influence policy, but because all interest groups do this in a symmetrical pattern, lobbying has no effects at all on equilibrium policy.
For t-0 both equations (27) and (28) coincide and a changing capital tax rate affects the utility of a representative household k irrespective of the country in which the household resides. A household with a capital endowment below the average thus benefits from increasing capital taxes raised in any foreign country in the same way as from increasing domestic capital taxes.
For a constant marginal utility of future consumption and a symmetrically distributed capital endowment, both stability conditions for the tax competition equilibrium are satisfied (see appendix c). The domestic capital tax rate thus increases with a rising weight of an interest group representing capital poor households and decreases with a rising weight of an interest group representing capital abundant households. Inserting equations (21), (22), (27) and (28) in equation (26) leads to the following expression for the marginal benefit of lobbying:
21 Equation (5) shows that, with a linear utility of future consumption, all households consume the same amount in ihe first period. Differences in their capital endowments are fully reflected in differences in their savings.
The following equation determines x t for a constant marginal utility of future consumption and for t = 0:
. (30) Equation (29) 
K' m
The marginal benefit of lobbying decreases continuously with an increasing number of countries N. Lobbying becomes less attractive for every interest group as the number of countries rises, and -as equation (25) So far, the impact of capital mobility on the lobbying activities has been derived under the special assumptions of a linear utility of future consumption, symmetrically distributed capital endowments and equal lobbying cost functions for all interest groups. For a large number of countries, these assumptions are not necessary to derive the negative impact of capital mobility on lobbying for capital income redistribution. 23 As equation (17) shows, the capital tax rate declines to zero for a sufficiently large number of countries, irrespective of the political weights of the different interest groups. In this case, lobbying completely loses its influence on the capital tax rate in an open economy. Since lobbying is costly at the margin, lobbying outlays will then decline to zero.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown how tax competition caused by international capital mobility may limit redistributional activities of governments and therefore may lead to a declining amount of resources spent for lobbying by interest groups. It thus has drawn a contrasting picture to the majority of the existing literature on international tax competition and its potential welfare implications. This literature abstracts from redistributional conflicts focusing on capital taxes raised for entirely allocative purposes. In reality, capital taxes have both allocative and distributive effects, so that a combination of the results derived here and those of the models of allocative tax competition probably describes international capital tax competition most accurately. An evaluation of the needs to coordinate tax policy internationally should thus also bear the contrasting welfare implications of both kinds of models in mind.
To reduce the complexity of the problem investigated here and to isolate main driving forces of redistributive capital tax competition, the paper has focused on a symmetric tax equilibrium. An exception of the symmetry assumption has been the comparative static analysis in section 2, showing how internationally different tax rates may reflect internationally different interest group activities. As another reason for asymmetries, Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) incorporate different population sizes of the countries in a model with allocative capital taxation. Small countries face a more elastic reaction of the capital stock on a changing tax rate and therefore raise a lower allocative capital tax rate than large countries. With an increasing elasticity of the capital reaction the marginal burden of the capital tax shifts from the mobile factor capital to the immobile factor labor. Thus, the redistributive usage of capital taxes should as well be expected to be relatively lower in small countries than in large countries. An asymmetric capital tax equilibrium may also result from the attempt of capital importing or exporting countries to influence -25-the interest rate in their favored direction (e.g. Hamada, 1966 This system can be expressed in matrix-form:
Using Cramer's rule, the following equations can be derived for the influence of a marginally increasing domestic tax rate on the domestic and foreign capital stock: 
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With its property \(/ < 0, the capital market equilibrium also satisfies the condition for local dynamic stability. This condition can be expressed as follows: 
AF n
This condition is satisfied.
b) Comparative Statics
The following comparative static analysis of the tax competition equilibrium is based on Dixit (1986) who describes the procedure of a comparative static analysis of an oligopoly equilibrium. According to the equations (15) and (16) For a constant Uj , the influence of the world interest rate 6n private savings is the same for all. households j. It is given by the following partial derivative of equation (5): ds) _ U 2 _ l dp Un A The second order condition a < 0 is thus satisfied. The first condition for stability, a + \N -\\b < Ois satisfied for t = 0 as the following equation shows:
28 For a constant marginal utility of future consumption, the term B in \|/ vanishes. 
